

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-M-263

27 January 1983

Minutes

Two Hundred and Fifty-ninth Meeting  
Wednesday, 26 January 1983, 1000-1200 Hours  
Room 4E64, Langley Headquarters Building

[redacted]

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Chairman  
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Robert C. Allen, Department of the Navy  
Mr. Maynard Anderson, Office of Secretary of Defense  
Mr. Lloyd E. Dean, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[redacted], Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. John McNamara, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force 25X1  
Col. George J. Mercuro, Department of the Air Force  
[redacted] National Security Agency 25X1  
Mr. Dennis Southern, Department of the Treasury

ALTERNATES PRESENT

[redacted] National Security Agency 25X1  
Mr. Thomas H. Blankenship, Department of Energy  
Mr. Edward J. Dansereau, Department of the Treasury [redacted] 25X1  
Mr. Frank Dill, Department of the Army  
Mr. Bernard Gattozzi, Department of Justice  
Capt. William C. Horn, USN, Department of the Navy  
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency 25X1  
[redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency

ALSO PRESENT

[redacted], Central Intelligence Agency 25X1  
Mr. Marvin Doig, Department of State  
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency 25X1  
Mr. Peter Nelson, Office of Secretary of Defense  
Mr. Franklin Standifer, Department of Justice (DEA)  
Mr. Joseph L. Tierney, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[redacted], Central Intelligence Agency [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency 25X1  
Executive Secretary  
SECOM Staff 25X1

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Preliminary Comments

The Chairman:

1. Advised that the DDCI had nonconcurred in the SECOM memorandum on leaks, and had told Mr. Casey he thought the Community was flailing around on the subject and no progress is possible without White House leadership. [redacted] agreed that White House backing is essential, and suggested we defer further initiatives on leaks to see if policy guidance is forthcoming. [redacted]

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2. Noted that the 3 December program presentations seemed to have been well received. [redacted] suggested the usefulness of scheduling others. He asked for member comments on possible presentations by the R&D Subcommittee and the Security Advisory Group USSR. Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] said they favored such presentations to keep members informed and to show support for subcommittee work. [redacted] advised he would schedule a special meeting in March for these presentations. [redacted]

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3. Reported that the IG/CM had tasked [redacted] to do a further study of the need for new national policy on TSCM, after receiving the SECOM paper on the subject prepared by TSCS. [redacted] reported on his presentations on leaks and damage assessments to the last IG/CM meeting. He complimented UDIS on the responses to the IG/CM tasking. He said he had told the IG/CM that current national policy proscribes leaks, and that the means to implement that policy are best expressed in the Willard Report. He noted that Mr. deGraffenreid, NSC Staff, told the IG/CM meeting that the Willard Report was still being staffed in the White House. General Stilwell tasked Mr. deGraffenreid to determine the status of the report and to advise the IG/CM at its next meeting. [redacted] reported that he had told the IG/CM that damage assessments should be done on an individual agency basis as is done now in order to accommodate agency-specific circumstances; that E.O. 12356 calls for such assessments to be done in case of compromise; and that a Community data base on key elements of assessments would be helpful in identifying how much the Soviets have learned from leaks and other compromises. He said General Stilwell commented that such a data base sounded like a good idea. [redacted] reminded members that the DDCI had disapproved a recommendation for a similar data base on leaks. [redacted]

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4. Said the IC Staff, principally [redacted] Chief of the Policy Planning Staff, is studying the computer security problem. [redacted] noted that RADM Burkhalter has indicated he is considering appointing a new interagency body with an independent chairman to make recommendations on the subject. [redacted] invited members' attention to his memo to the D/ICS on this subject. He noted that [redacted] had reported that the draft revision of DCID 1/16 should be ready for dissemination to members on or about 1 February 1983. [redacted]

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5. Welcomed Mr. Allen as the full Navy member of the Committee, and congratulated him on his promotion. Mr. Allen introduced Capt. Horn, Assistant Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, as a new Navy alternate.

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6. Advised that the IC Staff had been reorganized, and that the only effect on SECOM is that he now reports directly to the D/ICS rather than through the Office of Community Coordination, which has been abolished.

[redacted] said committee chairmen had been asked to comment on how they would implement the reorganization. He invited attention to copies at members' places of his memorandum in response. [redacted]

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7. Noted that members had at their places copies of correspondence between him and Mr. Klekner, Director of Security and Safety, GAO.

[redacted] said Mr. Klekner's request [redacted] training in audio countermeasures for GAO personnel was referred to the FBI. Mr. Dean expressed concern about possible proliferation of non-NFIB agency training; but, if GAO is a unique case, FBI could sponsor their training. [redacted] said training for Community agencies takes precedence, and that senior-level approval would be needed for GAO use [redacted]. Mr. Anderson questioned the need for GAO to obtain technical security training, and commented that the GAO mission doesn't seem to support the need for an in-house TSCM capability. Mr. Doig advised that State provides TSCM coverage to GAO's overseas sites. Mr. Dean suggested that Community agencies should conduct TSCM inspections for GAO. He noted that the FBI receives many requests from non-NFIB agencies for TSCM inspections, and that they turn down many of these based on their assessment of need and the availability of FBI resources. [redacted] advised that we would leave this matter in FBI hands. [redacted]

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8. Reminded members of his December memorandum asking for nominations to fill the staff positions previously held by [redacted]

[redacted] noted negative responses from Air Force, Army, Navy, FBI, Energy and Justice. He said he had received only one nomination to date - from CIA of an officer with technical security experience. He noted that since the SECOM professional staff now consists of the Executive Secretary and himself, there is an urgent need to fill the slots as soon as possible. Mr. Anderson said he was considering a possible nomination. [redacted] also plans to nominate two officers for the positions. [redacted]

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9. Reported that, based on earlier discussions with SECOM members, he had agreed to speak to a meeting of the Industrial Security Working Group, at their 15 February meeting at an approved contractor facility in the Washington area. He noted that his presentation would be at the Secret level, and would focus on SECOM organization, functions, and selected current issues. He said he would tell the group that SECOM welcomes input from them on security matters which affect industry, but remind them again that the group does not have status on the SECOM and that the relationship is exclusively informational. [redacted]

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10. Advised that the staff may be moved from the Headquarters building later this year, possibly to Roslyn or the Tyson's area. [redacted] noted advantages of [redacted] such as proximity to those CIA Office of Security elements which provide necessary services such as file checks.

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11. Reported that a memorandum of understanding had been concluded with the Department of State on its assumption of primary responsibility for the new Moscow Embassy security project. [redacted]

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12. Said the National Communications Security Committee has proposed a working group of the chairmen of SCOCE, SECOM's TSCS and its Audio Counter-measures Working Group, and possibly others, to develop a plan for more uniform application of technical security resources. This proposal was in response to IG/CM tasking to the NCSC for review of TEMPEST standards.

[redacted] noted copies at members' places of the NCSC memo on this. He asked that any comments members had on it be provided him by 10 February. He said he had written [redacted] IG/CM Secretary, asking that SECOM [redacted] element involvement in this matter be coordinated with him. [redacted] [redacted] advised [redacted] 748

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13. Advised that the DCI Protocol Office had informed him that [redacted] would like any interested SECOM members to be invited to his award ceremony scheduled for 11:00 a.m., 1 February 1983, in the Headquarters Auditorium. [redacted] asked those members who wanted to attend or send representatives to give [redacted] their names. [redacted]

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14. Invited members' attention to copies at their places of an IG/CM memorandum on industrial security. [redacted] said any timely comments members cared to provide would be welcome for his use at the 18 February IG/CM meeting. [redacted]

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#### ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes

In the absence of requests for change, the minutes of the 17 November, 3 December and 5 January meetings were approved as written. [redacted]

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#### ITEM 2 Subcommittee Reports

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B. Security Awareness [redacted] reported on an all-day subcommittee session at NSA Headquarters on 17 January. He said members

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discussed their charter, and advised that a draft of it would be submitted to [redacted] soon. Subcommittee members agreed to hold all-day meetings approximately quarterly instead of relatively short meetings monthly. He tasked the members to report at their March meeting (at the FBI Academy, Quantico) on what their agencies have and are using in the way of security awareness materials to combat leaks. He advised that sharing of damage assessment summaries would be helpful in giving security briefings specific impact. [redacted] reported that NSA was still working on a computer security videotape briefing, and FBI on a hostile threat one. He said experience showed that it takes more than a year to produce a videotape presentation, and noted that the Defense Audio-Visual Agency has capabilities in this area useful to the subcommittee. He stated that DIA had drafted a videotaped, fictional dramatization of the consequences of a leak to an intelligence source. SECOM members expressed interest in seeing this, called [redacted]

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C. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures - [redacted] reported that TSCS is screening many export license requests for overseas sales of countermeasures equipment. [redacted]

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[redacted] He noted that the White House had recently turned down installation of one of these systems pending security testing, and he advised that this action had apparently influenced the manufacturer to be cooperative in providing technical data for test purposes. [redacted] said training for Capitol Police would begin under FBI auspices on 31 January. He advised that the subcommittee had seen a demonstration of a birthday card made in Hong Kong which contained a built-in transmitter, battery and other circuitry, none of which was readily detectible. [redacted]

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D. Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations - [redacted] reported that meetings had been held at Justice (CIA, State, Criminal Division and Office of Intelligence Policy representatives) on proposed legislation to criminalize leaks by Government personnel. He advised that CIA and NSA, through separate initiatives, had again asked Justice to deal with the issue of sensitive intelligence documents held and published by Jack Anderson. He noted discussion at a recent UDIS meeting on whether the NSC Staff could be involved in UDIS deliberations in some fashion to provide better understanding of whether certain leaks were "authorized." [redacted] asked how this could be done. Discussion showed member interest in developing one or more contacts on the NSC Staff to check things with, rather than inviting NSC Staff participation on the subcommittee. [redacted] said he would explore possible contact relationships to determine from the NSC Staff whether investigation of a particular leak was desirable or not. [redacted] said the subcommittee had also discussed possible inclusion of the Department of Commerce on UDIS, and adding as observers personnel who actually investigate leaks so as to improve subcommittee understanding of investigative techniques, leak trends, etc. [redacted] said he thought adding investigators was a good idea. Mr. Anderson agreed. [redacted] advised that UDIS would address IG/CM tasking to produce a paper on sharing of information from and on creation of a data base concerning damage assessments. [redacted] and several members endorsed the formulation of a set of uniform data items to be recorded by all agencies, even though it appears we are precluded from establishing a data base now. In response to a question on the Jack Anderson problem, [redacted]

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said one initiative considered was a writ of replevin to get the documents back. He said Justice had originally reacted negatively to this, but now considered it an achievable measure. He noted that the CIA General Counsel questions the political wisdom of this approach. Mr. Anderson said General Stilwell was interested in this matter and wanted to encourage action on it.

[redacted] suggested OSD write Justice expressing its interest and support. [redacted] advised that UDIS would try to help the Security Awareness Subcommittee with ideas on how to focus public attention on damage done by leaks. He said UDIS had met with ORD personnel to discuss document and copy machine control initiatives. [redacted]

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E. Research & Development - [redacted] described subcommittee supporting 25X1 structure, FY 82 efforts, and FY 83 projects:

1. They have seven working groups:
  - a. Threat Assessment - chaired by Secret Service
  - b. Document Destruction - chaired by Army
  - c. Document Protection - chaired by DIA
  - d. Armor & Protective Systems - chaired by Secret Service
  - e. Secure Conference Rooms - chaired by CIA
  - f. Power Lines - chaired by NSA
  - g. Advanced Countermeasures Receiver - chaired by Air Force
2. FY 82 SECOM R&D funds [redacted] supported:
  - a. Development of advanced countermeasures receiver - [redacted] (CIA as executive agent)
  - b. R&D on portable secure vault - [redacted] CIA as executive agent)
  - c. Test and evaluation [redacted] exchange system - [redacted] (FBI as executive agent)
3. FY 83 SECOM R&D funds [redacted] will support:
  - a. Continuation of work on advanced countermeasures receiver - [redacted]
  - b. Computer security projects by Computer Security Subcommittee - [redacted]
  - c. Test and evaluation of technical surveillance and countermeasure equipment - [redacted]
  - d. Studies of foreign technical surveillance threats and countermeasures to them - [redacted]

[redacted]

e. [redacted]

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ITEM 3 DCID 1/14 Revision

[redacted] noted that [redacted] was on sick leave, and suggested 25X1 postponement of discussion on this item until we have a complete package on the proposed revision of DCID 1/14. A Personnel Security Subcommittee paper on various alternative language on the polygraph for inclusion in the draft was distributed and discussed. [redacted] 25X1

ITEM 4 [redacted] Report

Mr. Leidenheimer noted prior dissemination of a draft memorandum to the FBI concerning this report. He asked members if there were any objections to his sending this memorandum. There being none, it has been forwarded. [redacted] 25X1

ITEM 5 New Business

[redacted] advised that the next running of the adjudicators' seminar would be the week of 7-11 March [redacted] He asked that nominations for attendance be provided the SECOM staff no later than 11 February. [redacted] 25X1  
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ITEM 6 Next Meeting

[redacted] said the Committee needs to discuss and act at the next 25X1 meeting on the draft revisions of DCIDs 1/14 and 1/16 (both should be available for distribution to members in early February). He suggested a longer meeting than usual to allow enough time. Members agreed to his proposal to meet on Wednesday, 23 February 1982, at 9:00 a.m. [redacted] said some films or 25X1 videotapes of interest to members would be shown at that meeting, if time permits. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Executive Secretary